United States Court of International Trade

Slip Op. 20-123

Before the Court in Kent International, Inc. v. United States, Slip Op. 20-123, Court No. 15-00135 (August 25, 2020) were cross-motion for summary judgment regarding CBP’s classification of Plaintiff’s imported child safety seats for bicycles. Customs classified the subject merchandise under Subheading 8714.99.80 as parts and accessories of vehicles of heading 8711 to 8713: . . . Other: . . . Other, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”), with a 10% duty rate. Plaintiff argued that Customs violated the “treatment” provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c), as well as the established and uniform practice (“EUP”) provisions of 19 U.S.C. § 1315(d), and that the subject merchandise should be classified under Subheading 9401, HTSUS.  For the following reasons, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion and granted Defendant’s cross-motion.

To prevail on its claim that a EUP existed, Plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) a high number of entries resulting in the alleged uniform classifications, (2) a high number of ports at which the merchandise was entered, (3) an extended period of time over which the alleged uniform classifications took place, and (4) a lack of uncertainty regarding the classification over time.” Id. at 13. In this case, the Court found that Plaintiff could not demonstrate a “consistent application of any classification determination ‘on a national basis’ over any two-year time period.” Id. at 10.  The Court found that Plaintiff’s claim of treatment based on the entries of third parties failed for the same reason its claim of treatment based on its own entries failed.  Plaintiff argued that the best information available reflected “hundreds of entries at 14 ports of entry over a 10-year period” where Customs had developed a “EUP of classifying child bicycle seats under HTSUS heading 9401.” Id. at 13. However, the Court found that Plaintiff failed to address the fact that during the same timeframe, Plaintiff had numerous entries liquidate under Subheading 8714.  As such, the Court granted Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.  

Slip Op. 20-126

Before the Court in Red Sun Farms v. United States, et. al., Slip Op. 20-126 Court No. 19-00205, (August 26, 2020) was Defendant’s motion to dismiss in regards to Plaintiff’s challenge to Commerce’s final determination in the resumption of the previously suspended antidumping duty investigation on fresh tomatoes imports from Mexico. Defendant argued that “the challenge to the Final Determination does not present a live case or controversy because Red Sun Farms pays no antidumping duties, as certain entities comprising Red Sun Farms are signatories to the 2019 Suspension Agreement.” Id. at 6. For the following reasons, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

“Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Id. at 7. Two criteria guide a court in determining ripeness: “(1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Id. at 8. In this case, the Court found Plaintiff’s claims challenging the Final Determination were not ripe.  Plaintiff could not satisfy the hardship requirement because Plaintiff was not currently paying antidumping duties.  The Court explained that “Plaintiff may seek to challenge the Final Determination after its entities withdraw from the 2019 Suspension Agreement and after Commerce issues an antidumping order.” Id. at 9. However, Plaintiff “cannot obtain the benefits of paying zero antidumping duties under the 2019 Suspension Agreement while maintaining an after-the-fact challenge to the Final Determination, which currently has no impact.” Id. at 10. As such, the Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.